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ABSTRACT

A theory of organizational development is developed from turn-of-the-century geopolitical studies by combining the following: Smithian and Darwinian perspectives: the firmer concepts of management: and strategic planning views. An attempt is made to explore natural organizational processes by considering geopolitical, economic, biological, and management views. Six strategic characteristics of an organization are proposed based on: the historical work of Alfred Mahan, who analyzed the elements of British sea power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Halford Mackinder's 1904 analysis of pivotal land positions: Likert's (1967) work on participative models: Peterson's et al. (1967, 1970) studies on institutional vitality of colleges: Mott's (1972) work on organizational effectiveness: and the work of Cameron (1978), Katz and Kahn (1978), and others on characteristics, processes, and structures of healthy organizations, including colleges. Three of the strategic characteristics pertain to competitive advantage, and three pertain to the capacity to adapt. Those characteristics of effective organizations providing competitive advantage are as follows: productive centers of distinctive strength with internal and external links: pivotal locations (geographic and technological): and quality products. Those providing the capacity to adapt are as follows: permeable boundaries related to segmented markets: preponderance of staff employed in adaptive substructures: and executive-level encouragement to develop new products. It is suggested that since the strategic planning perspective emphasizes the organization's capacity to fulfill expectations in external environments, it also bridges both organization and supersystem theories, and closed and open systems theories. (SW)

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TOWARDS A NATURAL SYSTEMS THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: INTEGRATING GEOPOLITICAL, DARWINISTIC AND STRATEGIC PLANNING PERSPECTIVES

Abstract*

This paper takes turn-of-the-century studies of the elements of geopolitical success, gives the elements Darwinsitic and Smithian re-interpretations, and makes construct validity comparisons with contemporary organizational studies to arrive at a set of six characteristics considered necessary to ensure an entity's effectiveness in turbulent environments.

This interaction of the entity with its environment is seen from the strategic planning perspective, thus, incorporating both the internal processes and goal/output theories of effectiveness. As the strategic planning perspective emphasizes the organization's capacity to fulfill expectations in external environments, it also bridges both organization and supersystem theories, and closed and open systems theories.

The intent is to present old ideas in a new theoretical configuration of six relationships in two clusters. One cluster consists of three propositions considered necessary to provide the entity with competitive advantage; the other cluster of three propositions is considered necessary to provide a capacity to adapt. The theory suggests these six characteristics ensure vitality:

Providing Competitive Advantage: Effective entities have. . .

1. Productive centers of distinctive strength with internal and external links, and

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2. Pivotal locations--geographic and technological, and

3. Quality products.

Providing Adaptive Capacity: Effective entities have. . .

4. Permeable boundaries related to segmented markets

5. Preponderance of staff employed in adaptive sub-structures

6. Executive-level encouragement to develop new products

The evidence for saying these are the six strategic characteristics is in the historical work of Alfred Mahan, who analyzed the elements of British sea power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; is in Halford Mackinder's 1904 analysis of pivotal land positions; is in the more recent works of Likert (1967) on participative models, Peterson et al. on institutional vitality (1967 and 1970), Mott (1972) on organizational effectiveness, Cameron (1978), Katz and Kahn (1978) and others, on characteristics, processes and structures of healthy organizations. The six propositions suggested here, hopefully, are given explanatory strength and wide applicability because of the Darwinistic and trans-disciplinary nature of evidence.

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TOWARDS A NATURAL SYSTEMS THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS:
INTEGRATING GEOPOLITICAL, DARWINISTIC AND
STRATEGIC PLANNING PERSPECTIVES

Imagination is more important than knowledge.
--A. Einstein

Background and Purpose

Assuming a clear sense of mission, it is proposed only six remaining conditions are necessary to assure an entity's[1] vitality in turbulent environments:

1. Centers of distinctive strength with internal and external links.
2. Pivotal locations--geographic and technological.
3. Quality products.
4. Permeable boundaries related to segmented markets.
5. A majority of staff employed in substructures having adaptive functions.
6. Executive level encouragement to develop new products.

As this is an Adam Smith/Charles Darwin inspired search for embedded or embeddable[2] conditions, the first three conditions provide the institution with a competitive advantage, while the last three are necessary for adaptations. It is a Smithian view that sees the open-system, individualistic maneuvering of entities in an economy of exchanging values. It is a Darwinian image as well, with institutions groping in an environment seeking their niche. Together the view is or an evolutionary system in which order arises out of mutual adaptations by natural processes.

This approach is also clearly influenced by a view that says structures, technologies, leadership, goals and the environment, rather than interpersonal relations, morale, communication, productivity and the other narrower technologies (MBO, RRPM. . .) of internal management are the determinants of organizational success (cf. Perrow, 1970). Therefore, the six-point list does not include variables assuming greater importance in much of the management literature; in addition to those mentioned above, for example, these are performance evaluation, job satisfaction, teamwork, capacity to acquire resources, morale, and so on. It is assumed, as a result of having the six conditions, that organizations will acquire resources, will have high morale, will maintain adequate communication, will have adequate productivity, will keep costs in line, will acquire resources, and so on. These six conditions, along with an adequate sense of mission, are seen as driving forces, as the determinants of other elements.

A third influence on this approach--perhaps the first in importance--is strategic thinking, or as it is usually referred to, "strategic planning." The essence of strategic planning is to match an entity's mission and distinctive competencies to opportunities to serve in an environing, turbulent society. Drucker recently put it succinctly, "Planning tries to optimize for tomorrow the trends of today. Strategy aims to exploit the new and different opportunities of tomorrow." (1980, p. 61) Another earlier view from Drucker is also appropriate: strategic thinking does not stress efficiency, doing things well, but rather effectiveness, doing the right things. With the strategic view, as Hollowood (1979) expressed it, the challenge is to win, playing the "ultimate matrix game."

Purpose

By combining (1) Smithian and Darwinian perspectives, with (2) the firmer concepts of management, with (3) strategic planning views, it is my intent to explore an old vision of a new reality that is fundamental and simplified. It is an attempt to probe the mysteries of natural organizational processes by a transdisciplinary joining of informed views--geopolitical, economic, biological, and management.

I fear our understanding of what really makes organizations effective has been obscured by sophisticated intellectual aberrations and excessive quantifications in recent times. I am proposing a simplified model that optimizes partially dependent functions to come up with a strategic view that explains behavior. That directs vision. That gives guidance to analysis and policy.[3] I want it to be regarded as a fertile conceptual schema.

Essentially I argue that much prevalent organizational literature, especially that on organizational effectiveness is, in whole or in part, scientistic[4] simplification of realities that mislead rather than illuminate. The major difficulty is the axiom of "other things being equal" can never apply to an open system world of mostly unbounded organizational and personal action, innovation, and willfulness. There are no real constraints, no invariant influences, since everything is influenced, in no easily determined way, by everything else.

The entities are in a marketplace, partly consumer-oriented, partly entrepreneur-oriented, giving both consumers and entrepreneurs creative and dynamic roles taking advantage of opportunities. The result is that self-correcting, perpetually learning "organisms" are

incessantly adjusting plans, intentions, and expectations.

I have long doubted the capacity of manipulable mathematical formulae, reflecting multiple theory jungles, ever to tease out causal explanations of phenomena in open, social systems. Today we still witness continuing, almost total confusion in economics, sociology, education and the soft side of management, despite decades of quantitative research, about the most fundamental questions. As one who no longer believes new, sophisticated mathematical techniques lie just around the corner to explain even micro-organizational behaviors, I am pleased to share an old/new vision that began with Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Adam Smith, and Charles Darwin. I now seek construct validations among the contemporary empirical investigations of Paul Mott, Thomas Peters, Kim Cameron, Richard Peterson and other investigators of effective organizations. Eventually, the six propositions can be tested by systematic empirical research.

The remainder of this paper develops the schema from its source in the turn-of-the-century geopolitical analysis of Mahan (1890) and Mackinder (1904). Then there is a re-interpretation using Darwinian perspectives. Finally, contemporary organizational studies are analyzed to see if there are comparable propositions, even if arrayed differently. The analysis is tentative and speculative, intended more to stimulate the imagination than to prove anything.

Mahan/Mackinder Geopolitical Analysis

While it was not identified in 1890 as strategic thinking, Alfred Mahan's analysis of the six elements of British sea power and Halford Mackinder's 1904 analysis of pivotal land positions, have

served the military strategist well as they revealed the essentials, the roots, the principles of national strategic survival by presenting a new global vision. Mahan's and Mackinder's ideas are easily--if overly simply--outlined and illustrated.

Mahan's most celebrated work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, traces the growth of maritime powers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, reviewing in detail six elements (3 natural, 3 human) necessary for nations of that time to achieve power. His basic question was, "Why was Britain successful?"[5]

The book elaborates upon the elements of sea power--sea power as he broadly conceived of it. National prosperity, he concluded, depended on three "natural conditons":



1. Geographical position is seen as a matter of prime importance. Great Britain was viewed by Mahan as being in a particularly favored position as an island. It need not defend itself by land, nor extend itself over land, thereby wasting resources in defense. Further, because of its position on favored sea lanes, it could easily engage in trade. In comparison, because of facing on two great seas, France and the United States both needed to split their navies depriving them of concentrations. Holland had too much land boundary to protect, although Holland was well positioned on sea lanes (both the Atlantic and Rhine waterways).

2. Physical Conformation (Seaboard--the Coast)

Easy access offered by the seaboard promotes involvement with the world beyond. Quoting Mahan, ". . .the easier the access offered by the frontier to the region beyond, and in this case the sea, the greater

will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by it." Continuing he observes, "Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, and doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable streams, which facilitate the concentration in them of a country's trade. . ." (p. 35)

3. Extent of Territory

Here Mahan was thinking narrowly. His focus was upon the extent of territory in coastline. Also the proportion of people living along the coastline. Using the South during the Civil War for example, he pointed to the comparative lack of people living along the otherwise excellent stretches of coast having fine harbor facilities. "Coastline" could include navigable waterways, e.g. the Great Lakes, the Rhine, the Mississippi.

* * * * * *

In addition to the natural conditions he called attention to three conditions of people and government:

1. Number of population and their proclivity to go to sea.

France, he concluded, was not inclined to sea as it was (is) agricultural. Great Britain, on the other hand, had more of a maritime and commercial orientation. Mahan went on to say, ". . .and so, in point of population, it is not only the grand total, but the number following the sea. . .(p. 45)

2. National Character and Aptitudes.

Mahan concluded that an aptitude for commercial pursuits was a distinguishing feature of nations that have become "great upon the sea."

He saw both the English and the Dutch as nations of shopkeepers. While the Spanish and the Portuguese were simply seen as gold seeking. In the latter examples, nothing of permanence was created for exchange. The French were seen by Mahan as thrifty, hoarding, and unwilling to invest or to take risks.

He concluded that a tendency to trade is of paramount importance, therefore, vital nations must produce something to trade with. To quote him again, "[It] is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power." (p. 53)

3. Character of Government

A favorable attitude of government toward the growth of sea commerce and the manufacturing of goods for trade was necessary. Again to quote Mahan:

> The government by its policy can favor the natural growth of a people's industries and its tendencies to seek adventure and gain by way of the sea; or it can try to develop such industries and such sea-going bent, when they do not exist; or on the other hand, the government may by mistaken action check and fetter the progress which the people left to themselves would make.

Summary of Mahan

Mahan saw the struggles of the national powers throughout the era under examination as essentially a contest for control of the sea.[6] Among the six elements he stressed conditions favoring commercial orientation, "Almost without exception," he wrote, "history shows that aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of nations that at one time or another have been great upon the sea."[7]

The point of considering Mahan again today is to suggest that

his six elements, broadly conceived, serve contemporary management thinking well. Modern organizations--as does Britain--have (1) geographical position; (2) boundary attributes, (3) zones of commitment, (4) numbers of employees, (5) with varying "company" characteristics, and (6) are managed by organizations with more or less favorable attitudes toward the use of the other five elements. His six elements may be said to link closely to the root explanation of any entity's success, or lack of, in that entity's environment. As such, I suggest he probably identified strategic principles having enduring value even when not applied to nationstates.

The Nature of Strategic Thinking as Power Relationships--Mackinder[8]

Halford Mackinder's paper, read before Britain's Royal Geographic Society in 1904, is still regarded as the foundation stone for the modern science of geopolitics. Only 24 pages in length, it is considered a remarkable analysis of the link between geography and politics. His basic observation was that after approximately 400 years of exploration and expansion "the outline of the map of the world has been completed with approximate accuracy." Like America's Frederick Jackson Turner, he too saw the passing of the frontier; he saw the beginning of a "closed" political system that would be worldwide in scope. Already at the turn of the century he saw every "explosion" could be felt worldwide. We know that even better now because we have limitless possibilities to transmit influences with television, planes, faster land transportation, and space satellites. The question in his time became "where is the natural center of the new epoch?" Where is the pivot area?

The pivotal point of land, according to Mackinder, was the "World Island" of Central Eurasia. It (the World Island) has two-thirds of the land mass and seven-eighths of the world population.

Within the World Island, the key point, the geographical pivot, was seen largely as the land area occupied by the Soviet Union; yes, even before the energy crunch, that region north of the energy-rich Arabic lands. He saw this region as the natural center in the new epoch--a view he held until his death in the 1940s.

Outside the pivot area, Mackinder defined two crescents. Germany, Austria, India, and China were seen as in a great "inner crescent," while the "outer crescent" contained Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan.

Speaking, of course, as a geographer he concluded his paper by saying:

> The actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product on one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment and organization of competing peoples. . .The geographical quantities in the calculation are more measurable and more nearly constant than the human.

In Summary

Not only does his vision, when compared with Mahan, indicate the effect of new developments (railroads in his time) but also the passing of an epoch. In our time, especially since World War II, we have seen a golden era of expansion, when resource-requirement-prediction planning was important, to the present era of economic plateaus, and environmental instability, where positioning (rather than growth) becomes paramount. This is, it seems, an era in which to consider the value of a newer schema (theory), one that seeks to determine strategic pivotel "regions," recognizing that entities play out their history, making their moves, on shapes imagined by geographers, thus, the true strategist thinks with maps and must recognize the importance of competative advantage and adaptability in turbulent environments.

A Search for Construct Validity

The views of Mahan and Mackinder--following Mahan more directly--result in stating six conditions for success:

Natural Conditions

1. Maintain geographic position.
2. Have easy access along the seaboard to the sea.
3. Have a large proportion of people living along the coast.

Conditions of People and Government (aptitudes)

4. People in large numbers need to have a proclivity to go to sea.
5. People need to produce products for trade.
6. Government needs to favor the growth of products for trade."

By "modernizing" Mahan with the language of management and applying the competitive and adaptative views of Adam Smith and Charles Darwin one gets a new structure of six conditions as illustrated in Figure 1.

From Mahan's and Mackinder's stress on the importance of geographical position (number 1) and adding the greater importance of technologies today, the principle of pivotal geographic and technological positions emerges (number 2 under Darwin/Smith/Management column). From the realization that access to the sea (the surrounding environment), especially via deep water ports on estuaries, is important (number 2), emerge two principles (1) centers of distinctive strength (deep-water) with internal links ("estuaries" within the institutions), and (2) permeable boundary conditions (seaboard) linked to segmented markets (modern marketing).

FIGURE 1

MAHAN ⟶ DARWIN ⟶ MODERN MANAGEMENT


"MAHAN/MACKINDER"
"DARWIN/SMITH/MANAGEMENT"
NATURAL CONDITIONS
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
1. Maintain geographic position.
2. Have easy access along the seaboard to the sea.
3. Have a large proportion of people living along the coast.
1. Centers of distinctive strength with internal and external links.
2. Pivotal locations--geographic and technological.
3. Quality products.
CONDITIONS OF PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
4. People in large number need to have a proclivity to go to sea.
5. People need to produce products for trade.
6. Government needs to favor the growth of products for trade.
4. Permeable boundaries related to segmented markets.
5. Staff employed in adaptive substructures.
6. Executive-level encouragement to develop new products.

It is the meaning of the Poet's trade to re-create the fables and revive in men [and women] the energies by which they live

--A. D. Hope

Continuing briefly, the extent of territory in coastline, with people living on the coasts, and having a proclivity toward going to sea (numbers 3 and 4), emerges in more modern management language to stress the importance of having staff employed in boundary positions and in organizational substructures having adaptative functions.

Finally, the Mahan observations about the attitudes of people toward the creation of products for trade (number 5) and an attitude of government encouraging sea commerce along with the necessary manufacture of goods (number 6), emerge propositions about quality products and executive-level encouragement (Propositions 3 and 6).

The a priori analysis of Mahan and Mackinder and Darwinistic interpretations seem to provide a starting point for continuing with the basic six propositions. They do seem to have face validity. Delving more carefully into related organizational research, looking for systems of interrelationships or configurations among clusters of variables so far has not confirmed the six propositions, nor are they denied. No clear pattern of elements emerges among any of the literature examined so far. What emerges is a welter of variables. Behaviors, attitudes, structures, process, roles, power relationships, and so on, are unsystematically mixed into various lists and schematics usually without clear conceptual bases.

Too often these lists remind one of the principles of management approach criticized so effectively by Simon in 1957 when he wrote, "We talk about organizations in terms not unlike those used by the Ubangi medicine men to discuss a disease" (p. xiv). Simon and others (e.g., Mintzberg, 1977) are concerned about simplistic dogma and the lack of researchable theories.

Another limitation in the existing literature on effectiveness is the focus on elements on one hand that are primarily important to internal processes, such as communication adequacy, teamwork, participation, and so on, and on the other hand, included elements related to adjusting to the external environment, such as meeting local needs, continued contact with customers, and so on. Sometimes the internal and external are mixed in one schema with explanations. Elements touching on matters of structure, centrality of program, and centers of power for production, for example, are seldom included.

The proposed "model" places far less emphasis on internal conditions (communication, morale, mutual support. . .), although recognizing the importance of internal conditions for adapting effectively to internal problems, instead placing more emphasis on matters of structure and adapting to the environment, that is, a more organism-environment model.

The effectiveness concept closest to that proposed here is that of Mott (1972) who defines organizational effectiveness as "the ability of an organization to mobilize its centers of power for action--production and adaptation." Mott goes on to say, "Effective organizations are those that produce more and higher quality outputs and adapt more effectively to environmental and internal problems than do other similar organizations (Mott, 1972, p. 17).

Consequently, he concluded three conditions were necessary:

1. Centers of Power for production.
2. Centers of power to change routines.
3. Centers to cope with temporary changes.

FIGURE 2

LINKS AMONG CRITERIA FOR ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A SAMPLE OF COMPARISONS



Effective organizations produce, adapt, and are flexible. That is an oversimplification of Mott's work; however, given the exploratory nature of ideas presented in this paper, that should be sufficient for now.

Other clues to relationships between "my" six natural system elements and other selected[9] studies may be evident in Figure 2. Note how process, end-state, organization, individual, and so on, variables are intertwined in single studies reflecting a wide variety of phenomena from a variety of perspectives. Handy (1976) listed over 60 different variables in three sets (organization, individual, and environment) linked to the effectiveness of organizations. Cameron (1978) found 130 variables in a review of the literature prior to developing a grouping of nine dimensions for his research.

Cameron's nine dimensions were developed on an intuitive basis after interviewing personnel in colleges about what accounted for effectiveness at their institutions. He recognized "These nine dimensions represented conceptually different constructs. . . ." He did, however, demonstrate their construct validity. In Figure 2, I have collapsed Cameron's four separate student outcome dimensions into one (student development and satisfaction).

Peters's (1980) attributes characterizing effective management come from a study of 37 companies that are often referred to as examples of well-run organizations. For the purpose of this comparison I combined two attributes into one: "stress on one key business value" and "emphasis on doing what they know best" are "stress on key value/proven product" which appears to be conceptually close to "centers with links" in the proposed schema.

The article by Park (1980) draws heavily on Exxon's standards of management practice, or what Exxon refers to as "eight characteristics of effective management." These eight characteristics appear to be drawn largely from the human relations school of management practice, representing for the most part process variables, for example, teamwork, participation, communication, mutual support and performance evaluation.

The C.O.P.E. (1973) criteria are the result of efforts at the University of Illinois to evaluate the effectiveness of graduate programs. The four standards (quality, centrality, value, and potential) are considered the essential attributes of effective departments and were arrived at by combining the judgments of academics. The first three of these attributes link closely to the proposed characteristics, and the fourth (potential) is a synthesis of all six, as potential in the C.O.P.E. system refers to capacity for success.

The Institutional Functioning Inventory (IFI) developed by Education Testing Service (Peterson, 1972) proports to measure collegiate institution-level characteristics thought effective for providing vitality. Relatively few of the six propositions appear to fit. The reason, I suggest, is that most of the IFI items are not so much functions or even characteristics that provide for effectiveness in acquiring resources (the ultimate test of survival) but are rather--within the Academy--expressions of time-honored values: freedom, human diversity, concern for improving society, democratic governance, and so on.

A very rough comparison of the natural system characteristics with the other six lists of characteristics reveals substantial support for executive encouragement (EE), quality products (QP), and centers

with links (CL). Little support is evident for permeable boundaries (PB), adaptive substructures (AS), or pivotal locations (PL). Figure 3 summarizes the positive connections.

FIGURE 3

CONGRUENCE OF ITEMS ACROSS STUDIES

Natural Systems Characteristics					
Competitive			Adaptive		
Centers with Links (CL)	Pivotal Locations (PL)	Quality Products (QP)	Permeable Boundaries (PB)	Adaptive Substructures (AS)	Exec. Encourg. (EE)
Mott	C.O.P.E.	Peters	Peters	Mott	Peters
Peters		C.O.P.E.	Cameron	Peterson	Park
C.O.P.E.		Cameron			Cameron
		Park			Peterson*

* In Peterson's work both Meeting Local Needs and Concern for Innovation appear to resemble executive encouragement of new products (EE).

Implications

While I am satisfied for the moment that the six propositions make sense, that is, they have at least face validity, are concrete enough to suggest appropriate management action, and find "construct" validation in portions of the literature, I know each proposition represents a very complex matter and each must be examined more closely. For the purposes of further research, each proposition could become a focal point

for further analysis, and combined they provide a rich diversity, within the strategic planning view, for their roles as predictor, mediating and criterian variables.

Much still needs to be done to find more links between these propositions and other propositions. A first step is a better definition of terms. Later measurement devices can be constructed. Many already exist. As the propositions are not new--just newly reformulated--Cameron, Mott, Peters, Peterson, and others, have already developed measures.

For disciplinary guidance, I suggest the natural systems concept advanced here is most at home among organizational sociologists taking a social-structural viewpoint (cf. Perrow, 1970). The social-structural viewpoint also seems closest to the strategic planning perspective.[10] The strategic planning perspective simply gives more emphasis to application and places more emphasis on opportunity and threat in the entity's environment. Both address the roles people play, the relationships of groups in structures, the characteristics of organizations, and both take an open system point of view.

I am guardedly optimistic that we can find useful management principles by combining the lessons of history with adaptive organism/environment perspectives. One resulting interpretative schema is presented here. Given the mulitiplicity of variables impinging in any problem situation, precise results can, however, never be expected, giving--happily--women and men a guarantee of substantial independence and giving academics more work.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Entity = person, family, department, division, business, corporation, nation. The applicability of the conditions, sometimes referred to as propositions or characteristics, may be contingent on the type of entity. Here, however, I shall assume a univeralistic base.
2. As used here embedded or embeddable refers to characteristics already present or possible to put in place. The same terms are sometimes applied to studies of subunits within larger organizations.
3. I claim the conceptual schema explains, directs, and guides. To do so ignores Veblen's greater truth: it is not mechanistic relationships that ultimately provide direction, but the value system of the culture in which we are embedded. Accordingly, entities will have vitality to the extent they mirror, and occasionally when they become beacons for the cultural value systems which shape them. The Academy, in particular, values the pursuit of knowledge, ideas, and truth, as these are expected by society, yet the Academy exists in an environment of other institutions also supported by the values of society.
4. Irving Kristol's term.
5. Alfred Mahan was born in 1840. He was virtually an unknown American career officer until the publication of his book which is essentially an explanation of the use of British sea power.
6. Mahan readily conceded his six elements were not original, as they were in the earlier writings of Samuel Bacon and Walter Raleigh.

7. What has happened to Great Britain today? Tom O'Connell, writing on April 19, 1980 in the Journal-American (Bellevue, Washington): "England seems to have slipped backwards in efficiency, in production, in ambience, to the status of almost an underdeveloped nation. There is an aura of lassitude, indifference and resignation on the part of many English people one meets." Have the "conditions of people and government" as well as the "natural conditions" been altered?

8. This is largely a political-geographic perspective inspired by Halford J. Mackinder's paper, The Geographical Pivot of History, 1904. Mackinder was an English geographer, the "father of geopolitics." His ideas were later published in Democratic Ideals and Reality, 1919.

9. The review of other approaches is not complete. So far it gives extra emphasis to studies done with colleges, as that is closer to the author's specialization (college and university management). Subsequent comparative analysis needs to include the work of at least Miles on healthy organizations and Likert's System IV.

10. While I am not ready to accept it, there is a growing belief that strategic planning is in itself a formal discipline. See, for example, G. R. Wagner, "Strategic Thinking Supported by Risk Analysis," Long Range Planning, Vol. 13, June 1980, pp. 61-8.

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